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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS "NORMAL 
SCIENCE" 
Toni M. Massaro* 
An enduring feature of equal protection and substantive 
due process review of government action is being lost in much 
contemporary discourse: these challenges usually fail. Claims 
that the current Court is exceptionally activist are belied by its 
track record in this arena. The Justices interpret substantive due 
process and equal protection rights very narrowly, and protect 
citizens only from exceptionally egregious, biased, intrusive, or 
irrational government action.1 Most government follies easily 
withstand equal protection and substantive due process review. 
Although the Court plainly does intervene in important con-
texts, actual cases are unusual, emerge slowly, and hew to settled 
principles as far as possible. 
The 2002 Term displayed this pattern beautifully. The Court 
decided several substantive due process and equal protection 
cases and -characteristically- upheld the government's action 
in most of them, despite impressive evidence of irrationality.2 In 
two of the decisions, it did so unanimously and unceremoni-
ously.3 It allowed doctrine to evolve with the times in three other 
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1. I say this well aware of the civil rights remedy limitations that such narrow con-
structions imply after City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See, e.g., Kimel v. 
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 
U.S. 356 (2001). But see Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1984 
(2003) (upholding congressional power to enact the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 
2612(a)(1 )(c)(2000)). 
2. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244(2003); Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. 
Iowa, 123 S. Ct. 2156 (2003); City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope 
Found., 123 S. Ct. 1389 (2003). 
3. See Buckeye, 123 S. Ct. at 1391; Racing Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2161. 
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decisions, but these modifications were predictable and within 
the plausible reach of settled principles. 
The Court decided the equal protection and substantive due 
process cases through a hybrid mixture of formulas and pragma-
tism-not with pure formulas or pure pragmatism. The method 
is formulaic at its core and cautiously dynamic and non-
formulaic on its periphery. The doctrine moves incrementally 
with evolving social, political, and philosophical shifts in Ameri-
can culture, and contains very few surprises. Although the Court 
occasionally reaches decisions that effect a significant change in 
the application of fundamental principles, the Court makes no 
quantum leaps and rarely modifies the fundamental principles 
themselves. As Dan Farber has observed, constitutional law is 
"normal science,"4 not radical science. Simulating the common 
law process of decision-making, the Justices invoke available 
doctrinal support for shifts. They seek to cabin the impact of any 
changes, and they emphasize the limited role that the Court real-
istically can, and constitutionally should, play in shaping public 
policy. When a Court decision proves to be a tipping point for a 
new cultural trend, this is because the conditions for such change 
are ripe, not because the Court alone effects, in parthenogenetic 
bursts, extreme cultural reforms. 
When outrage erupts over Court decisions- as it did in 2003 
over the same-sex sodomy and affirmative action cases- it is be-
cause the issues are vigorously contested, have great emotional 
content, and could go either way under applicable doctrinal 
standards. It is not because the Court forges doctrine willy nilly. 
A Court run so amuck, mindful of no doctrinal tethers, would 
inspire impeachment efforts or demands that we pitch judicial 
review altogether-steps that very few serious commentators be-
lieve are justified. In sum, the sky is not falling over our democ-
ratic institutions; nor are the heavens opening for individual lib-
erty. 
The 2002 term offered a perfect illustration of how this 
modest, incrementalist approach to doctrinal evolution can spark 
angry howls of judicial activism. In Grutter v. Bollinger' and 
4. See Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986) 
(citing Thomas Kuhn's famous definition of normal science as "research firmly based 
upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular com-
munity acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its future practice." 
THOMAS KUHN, THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10 (2d ed. 1970)). 
5. 539 U.S. 306(2003). 
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Gratz v. Bollinger,6 the Court reviewed two race-conscious uni-
versity admissions policies.7 The Court upheld one of them and 
struck down the other, sparking acid reactions in some corridors 
and jubilation in others. 
The split outcomes, though, were both predictable and rea-
sonably supportable as a matter of precedent and public policy. 
The Court had suggested, before Grutter and Gratz that only 
very narrowly tailored remedial measures or "social emergen-
cies" justify race-conscious measures. The Court had been par-
ticularly hostile to racial "quotas" or "set-asides,"8 but it also had 
insisted that strict scrutiny is not necessarily fatal. 9 Moreover, the 
case law denouncing quotas had always been tempered by other 
official practices-including practices of the federal government 
-that continued to underscore the significance of race-
conscious goals, to stress the importance of diversity, and to use 
race-sensitive statistics to achieve these goals. 10 In Grutter and 
Gratz, the Court ended some of the uncertainty about the valid-
ity of these enduring practices by agreeing that achieving diver-
sity among students within a university is a compelling goal that 
can be advanced through narrowly tailored race-conscious 
measures.11 
In doing so, the Court also reinforced core principles of Jus-
tice Powell's opinion in University of California Regents v. 
Bakke,12 on which countless educational institutions have relied 
since 1978. Grutter and Gratz allowed these practices to con-
tinue, but only within specific guidelines. The Court in Grutter 
likewise pointed to the briefs filed by business and military lead-
ers, who maintained that race-conscious diversity remains essen-
tial in their domains. 13 At the same time, the Court warned that 
diversity measures must be carefully crafted to advance their 
6. 539 U.S. 244(2003). 
7. /d. at 252; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310. 
8. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978). 
9. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237. 
10. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. Pt. 100.3 ("In administering a program regarding which the 
recipient has previously discriminated against persons on the ground of race, color, or 
national origin, the recipient must take affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior 
dtscnmmatwn"); 29 C.F.R. _§ 1608.4 (encouraging and protecting voluntary affirmative 
actwn to tmprove opportumlles for women and minorities, and accepts "goals and time-
tables" if reasonably related to listed outcomes). 
11. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326. 
12. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265 (Powell, J.). 
13. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31. 
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goals and may not reach farther in time or scope than neces-
sary.14 
In sum, the Court juggled complex doctrinal and practical 
concerns and sought to create as little disruption as possible. It 
deferred to educator, military, and business leaders' opinions 
about real-world consequences. It preserved fractured judicial 
precedent, insofar as possible. It placed substantial limits on the 
future use of race conscious measure. And it settled an issue that 
had split the nation, and the lower courts, in ways that de-
manded Supreme Court attention. The Court nevertheless took 
a scolding from many critics, both for the approach and for the 
results. 
The Justices straddled a similar set of concerns in Lawrence 
v. Texas. 15 Five Justices held that a Texas law that prohibited 
same-sex sodomy violated substantive due process. 16 This deci-
sion Lawrence clearly represented a significant doctrinal pro-
gression. The majority noted the evolution of public mores about 
homosexuality, both nationally and internationally,17 and in-
voked case law reaching back to the 1960s to support the result.18 
The sixth vote to strike down the statute-cast by Court centrist 
Justice O'Connor-relied on equal protection reasoning from 
Romer v. Evans. 19 Again, however, the case was hardly radical in 
terms of the Judicial method or doctrinal progression. It never-
theless has become an emotional focal point for political conser-
vatives and for those who condemn dynamic interpretations of 
the Constitution. 
Significantly, the Court easily upheld government actions 
against equal protection and substantive due process challenges 
in two other cases during the 2002 term, both of which escaped 
media attention entirely.20 Yet these unnoticed cases offer im-
portant evidence that the Justices have not abandoned the tradi-
tional, weighty presumption against overturning government ac-
tion. On the contrary, they continue to exercise this power very 
sparingly. The absence of bright lines on the doctrinal margins 
and the transgression of lines in isolated cases do not obliterate 
14. !d. at 333-34. 
15. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
16. !d. at 2476. 
17. !d. at 2481. 
18. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
19. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Romer v. Evans, 
517 u.s. 620 (1996)). 
20. Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 123 S. Ct. 2156 (2003); City of Cuya-
hoga Falls, Ohio v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 123 S. Ct. 1389 (2003). 
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all meaningful lines. They mean that the Court eschews both 
hidebound formalism and free-form activism, much to the cha-
grin of critics from the political right and the political left. 
This Essay takes aim at critics who argue for more formal-
ism from the Court and who insist that the Justices disregard the 
limits of the Constitution and of judicial authority when they ex-
tend equal protection or substantive due process protections to 
new terrains. The Court's limited version of interpretive dyna-
mism is consistent with past practices and necessary to prevent 
"legal petrification."21 In practice, this dynamism is greatly tem-
pered by the many practical and constitutional limits on judicial 
review and by the centrist-to-very conservative composition of 
the federal judiciary. The increasingly popular indictment of the 
Court as a group of "wide-eyed activists" is terribly misleading, 
if not dangerous for judicial independence. 
I limit my inquiry here to only two constitutional rights and 
to October Term 2002, because the treatment of these rights 
during that Term offers a useful barometer of the Court's al-
leged judicial activism in exceptionally charged areas of constitu-
tional law.l begin with the unremarkable decisions, where the 
Court used its customary, blunt-lined rational basis test. I follow 
with a summary of the provocative cases, where the Court's dy-
namism becomes apparent and doctrinal lines and formalist 
methods blur. If one looks across the whole spectrum of cases, 
one sees that the Court uses both formalism and dynamism, but 
that formalism plainly is the rule, not the exception.The combi-
nation allows the Court to occasionally adopt new perspectives 
on traditional constitutional principles without having to aban-
don the principles themselves. 
I. UNDER THE MEDIA RADAR: RACING 
ASSOCIATION AND BUCKEYE 
Although the affirmative action and sodomy cases domi-
nated the 2002 Term and riveted a national audience, their doc-
trinal impact was softened by cases that received scant or no 
public attention. I highlight two of these sleepers. Such cases 
prove that equal protection and substantive due process doctrine 
remain unaltered at their cores. 
21. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,770 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring). 
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A. RACING ASSOCIATION 
The first example of judicial business as usual was Fitzgerald 
v. Racing Association of Central Iowa.Z2 Racing Association in-
volved a challenge to Iowa's disparate tax treatment of slot ma-
chines on excursion riverboats, relative to vis-a-vis slot machines 
at racetracks.23 Iowa taxed the adjusted revenues from slots on 
riverboats at a maximum rate of 20 percent. In contrast, under a 
1994 amendment to its laws, Iowa allowed racetracks to operate 
slot machines, but taxed adjusted revenues from those racetrack 
slots at a maximum rate of 36 percent.24 The racetrack owners 
brought suit, challenging the higher maximum tax rates as a vio-
lation of equal protection.25 
The Supreme Court of Iowa concluded that the differential 
was irrational because the higher maximum rate for racetrack 
slots defeated the alleged purpose of the 1994 law: to help race-
tracks recover from economic distress.26 It thus struck down the 
measure on equal protection grounds. The Supreme Court of the 
United States disagreed. In a brief and unanimous opinion for 
the Court, Justice Breyer rehearsed the most familiar version of 
rational basis analysis,27 in which tremendous deference is ac-
corded government action. First, there must be a plausible policy 
reason for a classification. Second, the legislative facts on which 
the classification appears to be based rationally may have been 
considered to be true by the governmental decision-maker. 
Third and finally, the relationship of the classification to its goal 
must not be so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary 
or irrational.28 
Classifications rarely flunk this traditional version of the ra-
tional basis test. They surely do not flunk the test, the Court 
noted, when the classification advances one goal but also serves 
another desirable (perhaps even contrary) end. As Justice 
Breyer stated, "if every subsidiary provision in a law designed to 
help racetracks had to help those racetracks and nothing more, 
then (since any tax rate hurts the racetracks when compared 
22. 123 S. Ct. at 2156. 
23. !d. 
24. /d. at 2158. 
25. /d. 
26. /d. 
27. See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); Heller 
v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,319-20 (1993). 
28. Racing Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2159. 
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with a lower rate) there could be no taxation of the racetracks at 
all. ,z9 
Justice Breyer then contrasted the tax differential in Racing 
Association with tax differentials based upon race, gender, in-
state versus out-of-state status, or length of residenc{u. All of 
these, he noted, would have triggered elevated scrutiny. 0 
B. BUCKEYE 
In City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope 
Foundation,31 the Court likewise used the conventional rational 
basis approach, though on a set of facts less obviously suited for 
uncritical deference to government. The issue in Buckeye was 
whether the Sixth Circuit erred in ruling that a race discrimina-
tion suit against the City could proceed to trial.32 The primary 
evidence of discrimination was that the City had submitted a fa-
cially neutral referendum petition to the voters that called for 
repeal of an ordinance authorizing construction of low-income 
housing, after public opposition to the housing project arose.33 A 
nonprofit corporation dedicated to developing affordable low-
income housing challenged the City's action on the ground that 
it gave effect to racial bias reflected in public opposition to the 
housing project. By submitting the petition to voters and refus-
ing to issue building permits while the petition was pending, the 
City allegedly violated the Equal Protection Clause.34 
The Court-again unanimously-rejected this equal protec-
tion argument. Justice O'Connor noted that there must be proof 
of government intent to discriminate?5 The official act at issue-
the referendum petitioning process-reflected no intent to dis-
criminate. That process was consistent with the City charter, 
which was facially neutral.36 The referendum itself was placed on 
the ballot by the City, but not enacted by it.37 The City engi-
neer's refusal to issue building permits while the petition was 
pending was a nondiscretionary, ministerial act.38 There was no 
29. !d. 
30. Id. 
31. 123 S. Ct. 1389 (2003). 
32. Id. at 1394. 
33. ld. at 1393. 
34. ld. 
35. !d. at 1394; see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
36. Buckeye, 123 S. Ct. at 1395. 
37. ld. 
38. ld. at 1396. 
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evidence that any of these official acts was motivated by racial 
animus or constituted selective enforcement of charter proce-
dures.39 
Although private citizens expressed racial animus, and al-
though some voters may have acted on racial animus, this did 
not of itself constitute "state action" sufficient to trigger equal 
protection review. Nor was there evidence that the City officials 
and private citizens had acted in concert, or that the former 
somehow exercised coercive power over the latter's decisions.40 
The Court in Buckeye likewise rejected the argument that 
the City's actions violated substantive due process.41 The corpo-
ration argued that because the City had already approved site 
plans for the low-income housing project, the corporation had a 
property interest in those permits. According to the corporation, 
the City arbitrarily denied the corporation the benefit of its site 
plan, and the submission of an administrative, land-use determi-
nation to the charter's referendum process was per se arbitrary 
conduct.42 
The Court never reached the question of whether the re-
spondents had a property interest in the building permits. It con-
cluded instead that the City engineer did not act arbitrarily in 
deciding not to issue the petitions while the referendum was 
pending.43 Only the most egregious government action violates 
substantive due process. Given the language of the City charter 
that no ordinance challenged by a petition could go into effect 
until approved by a majority of those voting thereon, the refusal 
to issue the permit in the interim was deemed sensible.44 
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that administrative 
matters could not be submitted to the referendum process.45 Un-
der City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, voters retain the 
power to govern through referendum with respect to any mat-
ter-legislative or administrative-within the realm of local af-
fairs.46 
39. /d. at 1395-96. 
40. !d. at 1395. 
41. /d. at 1396. 
42. !d. 
43. /d. 
44. !d. 
45. !d. 
46. 426 U.S. 668,676 (1976). 
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Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred.47 His 
concurrence was focused on the substantive due process portion 
of the majority opinion. Justice Scalia has long opposed any ex-
pansion of substantive due process. Short of abolishing the doc-
trine-his clearly preferred outcome-he favors cabining it. He 
thus admires Graham v. Connor,48 which held that substantive 
due process analysis is precluded whenever a "more specific" 
constitutional provision governs the same case. According to 
Justice Scalia, a more specific test in Buckrye did govern the cor-
poration's claim of an arbitrary deprivation of its nonfundamen-
talliberty interest-the equal protection clause.49 Thus, no sub-
stantive due process claim should have been available, let alone 
successful. 
This part of Justice Scalia's concurrence is worth highlight-
ing for two reasons. First, Justice Scalia is quite correct that 
Graham poses a logical block to a substantive due process claim. 
But, as I have stated elsewhere, Graham itself is an illogical de-
parture from the Court's customar6' method of interpreting over-
lapping constitutional provisions.5 Given that only one Justice 
joined Justice Scalia's concurrence in Buckeye, and none of the 
others even responded to his Graham-based argument, the 
Court evidently does not apply Graham outside of the narrow 
criminal procedure context in which it arose. I regard this as ex-
cellent news. 
Justice Scalia's concurrence also indicates that he was aware 
of Graham during the 2002 Term. Yet even he made no mention 
of Graham in any other case last term. In particular, Justice 
Scalia made no reference to Graham in Lawrence, though Law-
rence was decided only months after Buckeye.51 Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence in Lawrence relied expressly upon 
equal protection rather than substantive due process,52 and Jus-
tice Kennedy noted in his majority opinion that equal protection 
and substantive due process are "linked in important respects, 
and a decision on the latter point advances both interests. "53 If 
they are so interrelated, one wonders, what happens to the Gra-
47. Buckeye, 123 S. Ct. at 1397 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
48. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
49. Buckeye, 123 S. Ct. at 1397 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
50. See Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black?The Court's "lot for lot" Account 
of Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1086, 1110-21 (1998). 
51. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472 (decided June 26, 2003); Buckeye, 123 S. Ct. at 1389 
(decided March 25, 2003). 
52. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
53. !d. at 2472. 
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ham principle invoked by Justice Scalia in Buckeye? Why did 
Graham catch Justice Scalia's attention in one case but not the 
other? 
The answer, I submit, is that context matters-context af-
fects not only how substantive due process and equal protection 
principles are applied, but even whether they are applied. One 
need not look forward or backward to see how context affects 
the way the Justices shape doctrine, including a Justice who is 
acutely aware of and committed to avoiding such analytical dis-
continuities. In practice, the kind of strong doctrinal consistency 
and formalism that Justice Scalia desires cannot be observed 
across opinions within a single Term, or even across the opinions 
of one Justice -let alone across opinions written across a span of 
decades, which entail changing Justices, times, and events. To in-
sist upon consistency of this order is to insist upon a chimera. 
Formalism is especially unhelpful on the margins of doctrine, 
where the influence of social, political, technological and cultural 
changes is most visible and powerful. 
IMPLICATIONS 
Taken together, Racing Association and Buckeye suggest 
that even relatively easy equal protection and substantive due 
process cases occasionally earn Supreme Court attention. When 
they do, the Court-to a Justice-treats the cases summarily, 
with standard formulations of rational basis review. They also 
indicate that although judicial oversight of routine government 
acts may occur with some frequency, judicial overturns occur 
rarely-even in cases that raise the specter of racial bias. Racing 
Association and Buckeye are the norm, not the exception. They 
reinforce the doctrinal order and rigorous restraint that the tra-
ditional rational basis test represents. 
Rational basis review can produce upsets-as the 2002 
Term also proves. But this is not because rational basis, tradi-
tionally understood, has withered on the vine. The upsets tend to 
occur in cases where the Court refuses to identify a new classifi-
cation as "suspect" or name a new "fundamental" right, but nev-
ertheless is disturbed by the parallels to such categories. The re-
sult is a handful of cases-not a torrent-in which evidence of 
irrationality persuades the Court to intervene while refusing to 
adopt an across-the-board new category for elevated scrutiny. 
The Court stretches "rational basis" beyond the typical-some 
would say plausible-limits, and reaches results that suggest that 
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a more searching standard of review actually has been con-
ducted.54 These "stretch" cases, though, are aberrations; the 
baseline, a powerful presumption against judicial overturn of 
government action, still holds. 
The most interesting cases, of course, are the aberrations. 
Consequently, these capture media and scholarly attention. The 
Court does on occasion abandon formalism in favor of methods 
that are far more susceptible to nondoctrinal influences, more 
disruptive of expectations, and less deferential to government 
actors. When this happens, fur flies. 
II. HIGH-PROFILE CASES 
The Court decided three cases in the 2002 Term that at-
tracted wide public and media attention and caused considerable 
political uproar. It struck down Texas's same-sex sodomy law,55 
upheld one University of Michigan affirmative action policy,56 
and struck down another.57 According to the harshest critics, this 
trio of cases betrays an arrogant and elitist Court that disrespects 
democracy and needs to be cabined. 
Such accusations are baseless. None of these cases unduly 
compromised democratic will or represented a power-drunk ju-
diciary. All were reasonably consistent with precedent and 
reached predictable and sane results. Moreover, these cases do 
not stand alone, as the above discussion of Racing Association 
and Buckeye shows. As a whole, the 2002 Term revealed neither 
excessive "activism" nor excessive "passivity." 
A. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 
I begin with the case that triggered the most ferocious and 
sustained outcry from conservatives and Court critics: Lawrence 
v. Texas. In Lawrence, the Court struck down a Texas law that 
forbade same-sex sodomy, but not sodomy between male and 
female partners.58 Although all sophisticated Court watchers ex-
pected the Court to strike down the statute, most did not expect 
54. See, e.g., Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Camp-
bell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 
413 u.s. 528 (1973). 
55. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472. 
56. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306(2003). 
57. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244(2003). 
58. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475. 
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the majority to rely on substantive due process. Fewer still an-
ticipated that it would overrule Bowers v. Hardwick. Thus, the 
case was the biggest surprise of the Term. Yet the facts of the 
case actually were well suited to all of these responses, and the 
judicial tools were in place to support them. 
From a civil libertarian perspective, the case was a particu-
larly compelling one for judicial intervention. Acting on a false 
report of a weapons disturbance, police officers entered the pri-
vate residence of John Lawrence. After the baseline entry, the 
officers observed Lawrence and another adult male engaged in a 
consensual sexual act.59 Both were arrested and convicted of 
"deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same 
sex" in violation of a Texas statute that prohibited same-sex 
sodomy.60 Lawrence challenged the prosecution on equal protec-
tion and substantive due process grounds.61 
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Lawrence and re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's hold-
ing.62 Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, joined by Jus-
tices Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter. Justice Kennedy 
concluded that the statute violated the petitioner's liberty inter-
ests under substantive due process.63 Summarizing the case as 
one that involved "two adults who, with full and mutual consent 
from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to homo-
sexuallifestyle,"64 he insisted that the men were "entitled tore-
spect for their private lives. "65 
The most significant feature of the opinion, for purposes of 
this Essay, was that it openly embraced a dynamic approach to 
interpreting the Constitution: "history and tradition are the 
starting point but not in all cases the ending point, of the sub-
stantive due process inquiry. "66 Invoking established principles 
of liberty and the protection of human dignity, Kennedy noted 
that the past half century "showed growing awareness that lib-
erty protects adult persons in deciding how to conduct their pri-
vate lives in matters pertaining to sex."67 The Court's abortion 
59. /d. at 2476. 
60. /d. 
61. /d. 
62. /d. at 2484. 
63. /d. 
64. /d. 
65. /d. 
66. /d. at 2480, (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
67. /d. at 2478. 
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cases, as well earlier cases involving access to contraceptives, 
protect the right to be free from governmental control over "the 
most private human conduct, sexual behavior, ... in the most 
private of places, the home."68 Even if same-sex relations are not 
given formal recognition in the law, Justice Kennedy concluded, 
it is within the liberty of persons to choose that relationship 
without being punished as criminals.69 
Justice Kennedy rejected the argument that the "right" at 
stake in Lawrence was the narrow right to engage in same-sex 
sodomy or in any other, specifically defined sexual conduct. To 
so claim, he said, "demeaned the [petitioner's] claim, just as it 
would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is 
simply about the right to have sexual intercourse."70 Rather, the 
right at stake was the liberty interest of adult citizens- that is, 
the right to be left alone in a private domain to engage in private 
human conduct.71 
Justice Kennedy denounced outright the Court's 1986 ruling 
in Bowers v. Hardwick,72 which permitted Georgia to criminalize 
"homosexual sodomy" on several grounds. Bowers gave "lib-
erty" an unduly narrow construction.73 It did a poor job of can-
vassing the relevant history of criminal prosecution of same-sex 
relations.74 It placed excessive emphasis on historical practices 
and tradition.7 It wrongly used the "moral disapproval" of a ma-
jority of citizens as a primary basis for enforcing these views on 
the whole society through its criminal laws.76 Its doctrinal basis 
had been eroded by later cases such as Case/7 and Romer.78 Fi-
nally, it ignored competing moral and ethical standards, includ-
68. /d. (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965)). 
69. /d. 
70. /d. 
71. /d. 
72. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 176 (1986); Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 ("Bowers 
was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain 
binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled."). 
73. Lawrenre, 123 S. Ct. at 2478. 
74. /d. at 2480 ("(T]he historical grounds relied upon in Bowers are more complex 
than the majority opinion and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger indicate."). 
75. /d. 
76. /d. 
77. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
78. Romer, 517 U.S. at 620 (1996); Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482 ("The foundations 
of Bowers have sustained serious erosion from our recent decisions in Casey and Romer. 
When our precedent has been thus weakened, criticism from other sources is of greater 
significance"). 
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ing laws in the international community.79 These competing 
standards belie the sweeping claim in Bowers that "the history of 
Western civilization" and "Judeo Christian moral and ethical 
standards" uniformly negate the liberty interests of consenting 
same-sex adult partners acting in private.80 In any event, consti-
tutional notions of liberty favor protection of such conduct, not 
its criminalization. 
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment but did not 
join the Court in overruling Bowers, a case in which she formed 
part of the majority.81 She concluded that the Texas ban on 
same-sex sodomy, but not on opposite-sex sodomy, likely was 
inspired by animus against a politically unpopular group, not by 
any neutral assessment of the state's best interests. Conse-
quently, the ban violated even rational basis review under the 
equal protection clause.82 Reviewing several equal protection 
cases that apply what has been called "rational basis with bite,"83 
Justice O'Connor noted that these cases tend to involve dis-
criminatory regulations that inhibit important personal relation-
ships. A state plainly can regulate a wide range of personal con-
duct, but it cannot criminalize that conduct solely for some 
citizens and not others, where the reason for that distinction is 
baseless animus against the burdened citizens.84 This did not 
mean that all laws that distinguish between heterosexuals and 
homosexuals necessarily flunk the rational basis test of equal 
protection. If a state can cite other legitimate government inter-
ests, "such as national security or preserving the traditional insti-
tution of marriage," then the rational basis requirement may be 
met. 85 
Justice Scalia wrote a scalding dissent, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.86 He first condemned the 
majority for describing the petitioner's conduct as "an exercise 
of liberty" without articulating what, if any, fundamental right it 
entailed.87 The majority opinion engaged in "an unheard-of form 
79. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483. 
80. /d. at 2480-81. 
81. /d. at 2484 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
82. /d. at 2488. 
83. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court's 1971 Term; Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court, 86 HARY. L. REV. 1, 18-22 (1972). 
84. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); 
United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)). 
85. /d. at 2488 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
86. /d. (Scalia, 1 ., dissenting). 
87. /d. 
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of rational-basis review" that Justice Scalia warned would "have 
far-reaching implications beyond this case. "88 Bowers was only 
seventeen years old. Although he agreed that stare decisis is not 
an inexorable command, he objected to its inconsistent applica-
tion.89 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey,90 the Court cited popular condemnations of its precedent 
as a reason to uphold the central holding of Roe v. Wade. 91 In 
Lawrence, the majority pointed to condemnations of Bowers as a 
reason to overrule the case. Which way, Justice Scalia grumbled, 
will it be?92 
Justice Scalia was especially critical of the majority's disre-
gard of Washington v. Glucksberg,93 which he interprets to re-
quire that "only fundamental rights which are 'deeply rooted in 
this Nation's history and tradition' qualify for anything other 
than rational basis scrutiny under the doctrine of 'substantive 
due process. "'94 The majority in Lawrence nowhere described 
same-sex sodomy per seas a fundamental right. Justice Scalia ar-
gued that the opinion thus could only be based on the "rational 
basis" test and a conclusion that the Texas law furthered no le-
gitimate state interest.95 
Echoing Lord Patrick Devlin,96 Justice Scalia intoned that a 
"governing majority's belief that certain sexual behavior is 'im-
moral and unacceptable' constitutes a rational basis for regula-
tion ... 97 Otherwise, laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, and 
incest, too, would be of suspect constitutionality.98 Due process 
does not prevent the states from curtailing nonfundamental lib-
erties, provided these measures satisfy the very forgiving "ra-
tional basis" test.99 In Justice Scalia's view, Lawrence calls into 
question countless laws that are based on moral intuitions of the 
88. !d. 
89. !d. 
90. 505 u.s. 833 (1992). 
91. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
92. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2489 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
93. !d. at 2491-92. 
94. !d. at 2489 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)) (em-
phasis in original). 
95. !d. at 2492. 
96. See generally PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 86-101, (Ox-
ford University Press 1965) (arguing for a conception of "common morality" that justifies 
legislation). 
97. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
98. !d. 
99. !d. at 2493-96. 
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regulators and may constitute a "massive disruption of the cur-
rent social order. "100 
Finally, Scalia attacked both the majority's and Justice 
O'Connor's reasoning more pointedly. He described the opin-
ions as "the product of a Court, which is the product of law-
profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called 
homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by 
some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral op-
probrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual con-
duct. "101 He scolded the Court for taking "sides in the culture 
war, departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that 
the democratic rules of engagement are observed."102 Justice 
Scalia closed with the observation that he respects homosexuals' 
right to promote their "agenda" through "normal democratic 
means," but he believed that resolving this question is simply not 
the Court's job.103 
Justice Thomas wrote a very brief dissent in which he de-
scribed the Texas law as "uncommonly silly," but not unconstitu-
tional.104 Overturning silly laws is the job of the legislature. Were 
he a Texas legislator, Justice Thomas made clear, he would vote 
to repeal this particular law. 105 Thus, seven Justices thought the 
Texas law was irrational, but only six believed it should be over-
turned on constitutional grounds. 
B. GRUTTER AND GRATZ 
Less than a week before Lawrence was decided, the Court 
handed down two other cases that likewise inspired heated criti-
cisms from many conservatives and Court critics. The Court up-
held "diversity" as a compelling reason for universities and 
graduate schools to take race and ethnicity into account in ad-
missions, as one factor among many.106 All but Justices Thomas 
100. /d. at 2491. 
101. /d. at 2496. 
102. /d. at 2497. 
103. /d. (Justice Scalia has continued his attack on the majority opinion outside the 
courtroom. In a speech before the members of the Intercollegiate Studies Institute on 
October 23, 2003, he told the audience that the majority's decision ignores the Constitu-
tion in favor of "the latest academic understanding of liberal political theory." Anne 
Gearan, Justice Scalia Excoriates Court's Gay Sex Ruling, (Oct. 24, 2003), available at 
http://www.twincities.com/mld/pioneerpress/news/nationl7090205.htm (last visited Jan. 
19, 2004)). 
104. /d. at 2498 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
105. /d. 
106. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324-25. 
2004] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS "NORMAL SCIENCE" 563 
and Scalia endorsed this diversity justification for race-conscious 
measures.107 The Court split sharply, however, on whether the 
University of Michigan admissions policies in question were suf-
ficiently "narrowly tailored" to survive strict scrutiny. In Grutter, 
five Justices concluded that the law school admissions policy was 
narrowly tailored.108 In Gratz, six Justices concluded that under-
graduate admission policy was not narrowly tailored.109 Quite 
narrow factual distinctions between the two policies drove the 
split outcomes. 
A redeeming feature of the law school admissions policy 
was that it allowed officials to review each application individu-
ally. The law school officials took into account ways in which 
each applicant might add to class diversity, including racial and 
ethnic diversity, and sought to enroll a "critical mass" of mem-
bers of underrepresented minorities.110 In her majority opinion 
upholding the policy, Justice O'Connor she cited the following 
additional factors in support of the policy: 
The policX did not define diversity solely in terms of race and 
ethnicity. 11 
The "critical mass" concept used by the law school was not a 
fixed quota whereby the school set aside "seats" for minority 
students only.112 
A "race-blind" admissions program would have had a very 
dramatic impact on underrepresented minority admissions. 113 
Countless educational institutions since 1978 had modeled 
their admissions policies on Justice Powell's opinion in 
BakkeY4 
Justice O'Connor emphasized that "not every decision in-
fluenced by race is equally objectionable. "115 She deferred to the 
law school's judgment that diversity is essential to its educational 
mission and commented that the context of universities is a spe-
107. !d. at 315. 
108. !d. at 334. 
109. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275. 
110. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329. 
111. !d. at 338. 
112. !d. at 335. 
113. !d. at 319. 
114. !d. at 322-23. 
115. !d. at 327. 
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cial one in our constitutional tradition. 116 Courts should assume 
good faith by higher education officials, absent a showing to the 
contrary. 117 She also touted the demonstrable benefits of diver-
sity-citing in particular briefs filed by American businesses and 
the United States military.118 In a passage quoted in countless 
reports of the opinion, Justice O'Connor also noted that "effec-
tive participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in 
the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Na-
tion, indivisible, is to be realized. "119 
In characteristic fashion, Justice O'Connor then sought to 
contain the impact of the opinion by citing its many limitations. 
Specifically, the use of race or ethnicity must be "narrowly tai-
lored."120 Universities cannot adopt a quota system; rather, race 
or ethnicity must be only one part of an individualized, flexible 
consideration of each applicant that assesses all of the ways in 
which an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational en-
vironment.121 The process cannot insulate applicants who belong 
to certain racial or ethnic groups from competition with other 
applicants and must give substantial weight to qualities apart 
from race.122 
She then countered this list of limitations with still more ca-
veats. A university need not exhaust every conceivable race-
neutral measure before adopting a race-conscious policy,123 and 
it need not choose between maintaining a reputation for excel-
lence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educational oppor-
tunities to members of all groups. 124 She wrapped up with a pre-
diction that may become the most cited dictum from the Court 
in many years: she forecast that affirmative action will one day 
be unnecessary, and expressed hope that in twenty-five years, it 
will have completed its role in educational reform.125 
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer wrote concurring opinions in 
which they cautioned that while one can hope, one cannot not 
firmly forecast, when it will be safe to "sunset" affirmative ac-
116. /d. at 329. 
117. /d. at 348. 
118. /d. at 330-31. 
119. /d. at 332. 
120. /d. at 333. 
121. /d. at 334. 
122. /d. 
123. /d. at 339. 
124. /d. 
125. /d. at 343. 
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tion. 126 They emphasized the differences between measures de-
signed to burden racial minorities and those designed to boost 
opportunities.127 Given the American history of race discrimina-
tion and its lingering effects, the contrasting measures often may 
not deserve the same constitutional fate. 
As expected, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, 
Scalia, and Thomas found entirely unpersuasive the majority's 
razor thin distinctions between the undergraduate and law 
school policies.128 They viewed the concept of seating a "critical 
mass" of minority students as a mere smokescreen for quotas,129 
under which race operated as an automatic admissions factor in 
most instances. 
Justice Thomas' most powerful objection to the affirmative 
action policy was that the policies do far more harm than good 
for the intended beneficiaries. He invoked passages from a Fre-
derick Douglass speech to abolitionists, in which Douglass in-
sisted on justice for African Americans, but nothing more, add-
ing that greater "interference is doing ... positive injury."130 
Justice Thomas bitterly denounced the law school's affirmative 
action policy as a form of "racial aesthetics" that seduces under 
prepared minority law applicants to matriculate at an elite insti-
tution, where they continue to receive affirmative action bene-
fits, are then hired by employers with similar "aesthetic" goals, 
and finally are expelled from elite sectors when the system is 
through with them. 131 Eventually, Justice Thomas implied, mi-
nority graduates disappear from elite professional ranks because 
they are unable to perform adequately in these settings without 
the false buoying of affirmative action. 132 He castigated the ma-
jority for upholding the law school policy "not by interpreting 
the people's Constitution, but by responding to a faddish slogan 
of the cognoscenti." 133 
Justice Scalia too sharply condemned the majority. He ar-
gued that it disregarded the prevailing standard for strict scru-
tiny, and hewed to political influences, rather than to constitu-
tional dictates. 134 He objected to the majority's deference to 
126. !d. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
127. !d. at 345. 
128. !d. at 379 (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting). 
129. !d. at 385. 
130. !d. at 350 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
131. !d. at 372. 
132. !d. 
133. !d. at 350. 
134. !d. at 346 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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university judgments about the educational values of diversity 
and scoffed that the law school's "mystical 'critical mass' justifi-
cation for its discrimination by race challenge[ d] even the most 
gullible mind. "135 He continued: "the allegedly 'compelling state 
interest' at issue here is not the incremental 'educational benefit' 
that emanates from the fabled 'critical mass' of minority stu-
dents, but rather Michigan's interest in maintaining a 'prestige' 
law school whose normal admissions standards disproportion-
ately exclude blacks and other minorities. If that is a compelling 
state interest, everything is. "136 He also noted acidly that if diver-
sity were such an important vehicle for promoting tolerance, it 
would be equally important in the civil service system of the 
State of Michigan, as well as in private employment settings, so 
that such employers should "not be criticized -indeed, should be 
praised-if they also 'teach' good citizenship to their adult em-
ployees through a patriotic, all-American system of racial dis-
crimination in hiring. "137 He concluded: "the nonminority indi-
viduals who are deprived of a legal education, a civil service job, 
or any Job at all by reason of their skin color will surely under-
stand." 38 
In Gratz v. Bollinger139 the tide turned against the Univer-
sity of Michigan. The undergraduate admissions policy awarded 
twenty of the one hundred points needed for admission to the 
undergraduate program to any applicant from an "underrepre-
sented minority group" 140 Unlike the law school admissions pro-
gram, the undergraduate admissions program involved no indi-
vidualized, "holistic" consideration of each application.141 
Moreover, the twenty points it awarded to under represented 
minority group members had the practical effect of making race 
a decisive factor in the admission of any otherwise qualified mi-
nority applicant. 142 As such, six justices concluded that the policy 
was not narrowly tailored within the meaning of Grutter. 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the 
university's argument that the administrative burden of review-
ing each applicant's file justified a set "points" approach.143 Ad-
135. /d. at 346-47. 
136. Id. at 347. 
137. /d. at 348. 
138. /d. 
139. 539 U.S. at 244. 
140. /d. at 277. 
141. /d. at 274. 
142. /d. at 272. 
143. /d. at 275. 
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ministrative convenience and expense, the Chief Justice coun-
tered, were not adequate reasons to uphold a constitutionally 
suspect policy.144 
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence in which 
she identified the flawed parts of the Michigan policy and sug-
gested that Michigan could modify its admissions system to res-
cue its mission of seating a diverse class.145 Justice Breyer con-
curred in the judgment of the Court and joined in Justice 
O'Connor's opinion except insofar as it endorsed the majority's 
rationale. 146 Contrasting "benign" discrimination with invidious 
discrimination, he argued that the former can survive strict scru-
tiny in some situations where the latter cannot.147 Justice Breyer 
nevertheless voted to strike down the undergraduate policy, pre-
sumably because he believed it went too far to advance these 
benign goals. 
Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter dissented. 148 In their 
view, the undergraduate program's "points" method of acknowl-
edging race was no more objectionably race-conscious than the 
law school's holistic "critical mass" policy was.149 Moreover, it 
was commendably transparent and properly tailored to ensure 
diversity in the undergraduate population.150 
Taken together, the two cases endorsed diversity as a wor-
thy goal, but in very significant contextual and temporal brack-
ets. The Court treated student body diversity as a means of en-
riching the classroom environment for all students, not only 
those who receive the admissions preferences. Yet it demanded 
a thicker version of diversity than any simple racial or ethnic 
goal implies. 
All eyes now will turn to the particulars of admissions pro-
grams across the country. Defenders of these policies will be ex-
pected to explain how they work, to what extent they are indi-
vidualized and "holistic," and whether (and how) they place 
weight on race and ethnicity. Race-conscious recruitment and 
admissions policies must be justified and individualized, which 
will be an expensive proposition for large public universities that 
receive thousands of applications each year. The Michigan cases 
144. /d. 
145. /d. at 279 (O'Connor, 1., concurring). 
146. /d. (Breyer, J., concurring). 
147. /d. at 283. 
148. /d. at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
149. /d. (Souter, J., dissenting). 
150. /d. at 296. 
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do not oblige public universities to take race and ethnicity into 
account; they merely allow schools to do so, within limits. Con-
sequently, states still may pass laws, and citizens may continue to 
propose referendums, that prohibit use of race in university ad-
missions/51 and universities can voluntarily abandon race-
conscious measures. 
The many caveats built into both cases and the thin factual 
distinctions between them make them difficult to synthesize. In 
Grutter, Justice Scalia predicted a flurrts of fact-specific lawsuits 
in the aftermath of Grutter and Gratz, 52 because their context-
sensitive results, he argued, are open invitations to free-form 
litigation over other schools' admissions policies, over race-
conscious scholarship programs, and over race-conscious policies 
in many other domains. 153 "I do not look forward to any of these 
cases," he grimly predicted. 154 
Justice Scalia's dread is somewhat difficult to understand, 
however, given standard Supreme Court fare. Whether a holiday 
display violates the Establishment Clause/55 whether a govern-
ment subsidy scheme imposes an undue burden on free speech 
or religion, 156 whether substantive due process is violated by laws 
that burden reproductive freedom/57 whether government regu-
lation of land use "goes too far" and constitutes a "taking,"158 or 
whether a federal civil rights statute is "proportional" to the 
harms it seeks to remedy159 - to take but a few thorny examples -
can hinge on similarly narrow factual and doctrinal distinctions. 
The affirmative action cases are hardly unique in this respect. 
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia is clearly correct, that many is-
sues related to affirmative action remain unresolved. For exam-
151. In Michigan, a "Michigan Civil Rights Initiative" has been drafted to amend the 
state Constitution to prohibit the universities, the state, and all other state entities "from 
discriminating or granting preferential treatment based on race, sex, color, ethnicity, or 
national origin." Michigan Civil Rights Initiative, http:www.mcri2004.org/. It remains to 
be seen whether this proposed amendment will secure the necessary signatures to be 
adopted. Of course, California (Prop. 209) and Washington (Initiative 200) already have 
state measures that prohibit race-conscious admissions policies. 
152. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
153. /d. at 347-48. 
154. /d. at 349. 
155. County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
156. Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 521 U.S. 533 (2001); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 
U.S. 173 (1991); Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 738 (2002). 
157. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Webster v. Reprod. Health Ser-
vices, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
158. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'! Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 
(2002); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
159. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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pie, current federal government policy permits the use of race as 
one factor in student financial aid, under narrow conditions 
based primarily on a remedy theory.160 Whether race-conscious 
scholarships created for diversity purposes are constitutional is 
an issue that almost certainly with inspire litigation. 
Another, looming question is whether educational outreach 
programs can be targeted solely toward racial and ethnic minori-
ties. For example, if an engineering school tends to under enroll 
or retain minority student::;, may it offer a pre-enrollment or 
post-enrollment academic support program for minority students 
only? The recent cases cast doubt on the "minority only" aspect 
of such a program, but also suggest that such a program might be 
a sensible, time-limited measure that advances diversity without 
displacing innocent third parties from enrolling in the engineer-
ing school. 
Finally, the cases do not settle whether achieving "diversity" 
now is a compelling reason for race-conscious measures in other 
contexts, especially employment. Justice Scalia is quite right to 
expect these litigation scenarios, if not dread them. No one 
should expect, however, that strict scrutiny is now a flaccid test, 
any more than one should expect, after Lawrence, that the ra-
tional basis test has grown large teeth. 
Ill. THE SKY IS NOT FALLING-THE HEAVENS 
ARE NOT OPENING 
The current Court has not abandoned its traditional "hands 
off" approach to review of most government action, as much as 
some people fear-or as others may hope. Racing Association 
and Buckeye prove there still is a rational basis "there there," 
under which successful challenges of governmental action re-
main very rare. When the Court is more interventionist, it is re-
sponding to multiple, powerful forces that may include changes 
in social practices and attitudes, community and judicial experi-
ence with traditional rules and their impact on citizens, empathic 
shifts, and a host of other factors that inform judicial and popu-
160. See Department of Education: Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Pro-
grams; Title VI of the Civil rights Act of 1964 59 Fed. Reg. 87,56, 87,61 (Feb. 23, 1994) 
(the regulatiOns also allow schools to consider race or national origin, among other fac-
tors, as a conditiOn of ehg1biiity for a1d to promote diversity, but only if the measures are 
"narrowly tailored"); see also Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (en 
bane). 
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lar distinctions between merely foolish and absurdly irrational 
policies. 
These shifts in judicial thinking begin slowly and episodi-
cally. When new claims for intervention first emerge, they usu-
ally are denied-occasionally over an impassioned dissent and 
public ripples of consternation. When the new claims begin to 
prevail, they often involve attacks on the most coercive forms of 
government power-such as criminal punishment. These early 
successes appear aberrational- doctrinal footnotes, or "cf." ma-
terial. Slowly, however, the rulings may be extended to less coer-
cive forms of government action, until a generally accepted pre-
sumption emerges that the classification (e.g. homosexuality, 
gender, race) is an "irrational" basis for any government action. 
Lawrence, Grutter, and aspects of Gratz reflect such doc-
trinal evolution. Lawrence involved parties-gay men-who 
barely elided the Court's traditional indicia of a "suspect classifi-
cation. "161 Classifications based upon sexual orientation do, in 
some ways, operate as "suspect" classifications do: they look 
past a person's actual character and seize upon a perceived 
status as a proxy for characteristics that might otherwise justify 
legislative burdens. These classifications also are often used to 
deny or burden basic opportunities -like employment or sexual 
autonomy-that do not fall within accepted categories of "fun-
damental rights,"162 but that share some of the characteristics of 
fundamental rights because they are central to one's ability to 
fully participate in public arenas, or to enjoy customary levels of 
liberty in private arenas. When a sexual orientation classification 
impinges directly upon the right to engage in sexual intimacy, as 
it did in Lawrence, it strikes a zone that the state rarely enters 
without a compelling reason, let alone to criminalize conduct by 
consenting adults. Of course, the state does intrude into this 
realm on occasion, and the notion that it cannot do so as a mat-
ter of constitutional law has never sat easily with all of the Jus-
tices. But the latter proposition itself is controversial, especially 
to strong libertarians who would first require substantial evi-
dence of tangible harm to others before allowing government to 
intrude. In sum, the facts of Lawrence closely resembled, yet de-
parted from, classic strict scrutiny cases. 
161. Laurence Tribe has called this the "covert" use of a higher standard of scrutiny. 
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1445 (2d ed. 1988). 
162. The doctrinal concept of "fundamental rights" in this arena evolved from Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,450 (1938). 
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The admissions policy in Grutter likewise elided existing 
formal categories. The policy deployed race as a criterion but did 
so to assist, not burden, racial minorities. The intent and the 
generally accepted meaning of the racial classification in Grutter 
thus were distinguishable from the racial classifications deployed 
before Brown v. Board of Education. 163 Although the Court in 
recent years has insisted that all racial classifications trigger strict 
scrutiny, even if motivated by benign instincts,164 this has been 
analytically, politically, and practically fraught. Consequently, a 
majority of the Court has consistently maintained that strict 
scrutiny can be satisfied, even in cases that involve race. That is, 
some of the Justices -like many citizens-do not believe that all 
race classifications are equally "irrational," given our cultural 
backdrop of de jure and de factoracism. 
The policy in Gratz matched most of the features of the pol-
icy in Gruffer, but with one crucial difference: the Gratz policy 
overtly used a "rigid" number of "points" in a way that Bakke 
condemned.165 This slight-critics might say functionally imma-
terial- in the structure of the racial preference was enough to tip 
the policy into an existing judicial category and trigger its de-
mise. 
Both of the University of Michigan cases were distinguish-
able from Racing Association because they involved a traditional 
suspect classification- race. Consequently, both admissions poli-
cies ostensibly received "strict" judicial scrutiny, not mere ra-
tional basis review. Significantly, however, only one of the poli-
cies was overturned, despite this closer review. 
Lawrence too was distinguishable from Racing Association, 
even though it arguably relied upon "rational basis" in overturn-
ing the Texas sodomy law. Again, Lawrence entailed two impor-
tant interests-protection of adults' privacy in their own 
homes166 and rejection of "mere animus" as a basis for legislative 
distinctions. 167 Lawrence's significant doctrinal contribution con-
sisted of enabling a majority of the Court to extend this privacy 
zone to embrace all consenting adults, without regard to sex of 
163. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) 
(upholding racial classification as warranted by national security). 
164. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
165. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). 
166. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia 2394 U.S. 557 (1969) . 
. ~67. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
L1vmg Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 
(1973). 
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the partner. The state could not cast its gaze on heterosexual re-
lationships before Lawrence; now it also cannot cast its gaze on 
homosexual relationships. The constitutional norm at stake re-
mains essentially the same: government should not intrude into 
this most private of adult realms, absent a convincing reason, 
such as the prevention of significant concrete harm to others. 
Lawrence thus did not shift established principles or renounce 
traditional majoritarian power, as Justice Scalia warned. Rather, 
Lawrence applied established principles to new choices by the 
same adult or-viewed another way-to other adults long 
thought to be beyond majoritarian dictates. Lawrence also rep-
resented, of course, a shift in judicial thinking about the harms of 
homosexuality to the wider community and thus of the rational-
ity of official decisions to condemn, criminalize, or otherwise 
punish it. 
Indeed, the Court showed remarkable judicial restraint dur-
ing the 2002 Term. It upheld the Iowa tax law differential. It up-
held an apparently race-skewed referendum in Buckeye. It al-
lowed one race-conscious admissions policy to stand despite 
strict scrutiny and struck down another on very narrow factual 
grounds while offering suggestions about how the policy might 
be redrafted. In its sole display of activism, Lawrence, the Court 
relied upon precedent and took great pains to narrow its holding 
to the regulation of adult consensual sexual practices within the 
most intimate of spaces, the home. 
Although critics complain that cases like Lawrence hike tra-
ditional rational basis review onto stilts and that cases like Grut-
ter transform traditional strict scrutiny into a meager version of 
itself, the cases actually do neither. Though tested on the mar-
gins, the traditional formulations remain intact. 
Such marginal stress is inevitable and healthy. There always 
have been and always will be cases that defy judicially crafted 
boundaries and that resist easy analogy to familiar fact patterns. 
These cases require the Court to reconsider the traditional 
boundaries and to take a deeper look at the principles that first 
inspired those boundaries. 168 The methodology is inherently non-
formulaic because the cases lie on the margins of formulas. 
168. The interplay within constitutional doctrine between fixed categories and inter-
category "float" is perpetual. Deductive logic is of limited use in these cases, given the 
opacity of the text, history, traditions, and the policy factors that inform these decisions. 
This is so despite the many good works detailing the perils of "balancing tests." See, e.g., 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitwional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 
(1987). 
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These cases require the Court to look beyond doctrine in assess-
ing whether to extend doctrine to new terrain. The majority's 
consideration of the social real world developments in Lawrence 
and in the affirmative action cases,169 and its recognition that cul-
tural changes may influence constitutional outcomes, thus were 
entirely sensible means of resolving difficult cases. 
Of course, there are other ways. The Court could refuse to 
ever apply equal protection or substantive due process protec-
tion beyond the categories already established in settled case 
law. This certainly would offer greater doctrinal clarity and quiet 
critics of the Court's alleged activism. A "no growth" approach 
is absurd, however, if one considers how much terrain modern 
government covers, how few "suspect classifications" and fun-
damental rights already have been identified, and how many 
ways government can test the limits of substantive "reason." Al-
lowing for doctrinal migration -despite its difficulties-is vastly 
preferable to doctrinal stagnation. It is also a very familiar proc-
ess in American law. As Justice Souter has said, "it is here that 
the value of common law method becomes apparent, for the 
usual thinking of the common law is suspicious of the ali-or-
nothing analysis that tends to produce legal petrification. "170 
To reject "legal petrification" does not mean a whole-
hearted embrace of open-ended formulations of rationality. Our 
Court is unlikely to ever adopt a fluid, "We know it when we see 
it" standard of rational basis review. Such an open-ended ap-
proach would be rejected by most -if not all -of the sitting Jus-
tices. Indeed, Justice Scalia has made very clear that he believes 
any "common law" approach to constitutional interpretation-
even the quite moderate one the Court actually follows-is an 
unprincipled overturning of democratic will,171 a charge that all 
should find worrisome. 
Yet despite Justice Scalia's thoughtful and persistent objec-
tions to the Court's present approach, and a more generally 
shared resistance to judicial activism, the Court continues to re-
view and occasionally overturns government acts under equal 
protection and substantive due process even in the absence of 
169. See Grwter, 539 U.S. at 306 (recognizing the expertise of a university in making 
"complex educational judgments"). 
170. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,770 (1997) (Souter, 1., concurring). 
171. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 37-41 (1997); see also Antonio Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1186-87 (1989) (acknowledging that balancing modes of analysis 
are mevllable, but should be avoided where possible). 
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plain text, uninterrupted historical practices, or other reasonably 
steadfast anchors of interpretation. Lawrence can be read as a 
substantive due process case that fell outside of all established 
categories of fundamental rights or suspect classes, yet over-
turned government policy. Earlier cases such as Romer v. Ev-
ans172 also relied on the traditional rational basis test of equal 
protection, yet overturned government action. Can this practice 
of doctrinal modification without resort to text, history, or even 
the judicially established categories of elevated scrutiny be justi-
fied? 
The answer, I believe, is yes. Dynamic play in the doctrinal 
joints is justified by past judicial practice, by the imperfect na-
ture of government, by the shortcomings of existing categories, 
and by the Court's special role. I will highlight here only the 
most powerful features of each argument, as they apply to cases 
from 2002.173 
1. Past Judicial Practice 
Constitutional doctrine is and has always been a human 
creation, not a divine emanation arising from the text or framers' 
intent. Equal protection and substantive due process doctrine 
are no exception. The cases depend upon human judgment as in-
formed by human experience, both of which are malleable in 
ways that defy formalism. For example, the cases that first iden-
tified "suspect classes" or "fundamental rights" entailed a dy-
namic and fluid approach to rights, under which the Court ac-
commodated changed perspectives on government power, on 
affected private interests, and on the delicate balance between 
them. The Court attached these analytically significant labels 
only after it considered a complex set of factors, including socio-
political phenomena external to text and doctrine. 
The so-called "selective incorporation" of rights into the 
Fourteenth Amendment likewise occurred over time and en-
tailed judgment calls not dictated by text. The Court deemed 
freedom of speech to be incorporated into fourteenth amend-
ment due process in 1925,174 though the fourteenth amendment 
nowhere mentions freedom of speech. "Due process" is hardly 
an obvious or uncontroversial signal that the framers of the four-
172. 517 U.S. at 620. 
173. A fuller account of my views about dynamism at the margins of judicial catego-
ries can be found in Massaro, supra note 50. 
174. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
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teenth amendment intended to incorporate any specific part of 
the Bill of Rights, including freedom of speech. Moreover, even 
after the Court deemed freedom of speech to be fundamental to 
ordered liberty and thus part of substantive due process, it used 
"reasonableness" as the test of state-imposed burdens on expres-
sion.175 "Strict scrutiny" of state action in this arena is a quite re-
cent judicial invention.176 In any event, whether the Court ana-
lyzes freedom of expression under a flaccid "rational basis" test, 
the most demanding version of "strict scrutiny" test, or "inter-
mediate" scrutiny, the Court weighs multiple factors that might 
plausibly be better weighed by legislators or other nonjudicial 
actors. The burden on speech, potential harms or "secondary ef-
fects" of speech, the comparative value of speech, and whether 
reasonable alternative methods of expression exist- none of 
these factors is susceptible to wholly objective measurements, 
and all entail policy determinations. Yet few people, including 
Justice Scalia, would claim that the Court usurps democratic will 
when it makes first amendment decisions. 
First amendment law may be iconic, but it is not unique. In 
countless other areas of constitutional law the Court engages in a 
common law-like process of doctrinal development. In each 
area, the Court accommodates changes on the margins of ac-
cepted law because the Court finds it impossible-as well it 
should-to uphold government acts that defy constitutional 
"reason," as this notion has been and is informed by logical ex-
tensions of the underlying constitutional principles, by analogy 
to the accepted elevated scrutiny cases, by the Justices' practical 
experiences, and by evolving cultural norms of "reason. " 
Here again, Lawrence is an excellent if controversial exam-
ple of dynamic constitutional interpretation. The majority could 
not stand idle in the face of legislation that struck it as intoler-
able, given precedent regarding the scope of sexual autonomy, 
changed attitudes about the alleged social harms of homosexual-
ity, and a growing sense that criminalizing this behavior was il-
liberal, even cruel. Missing from the opinion, of course, were key 
phrases-especially "fundamental right"- that the Court in re-
cent decades has linked to outcomes that struck down govern-
ment acts otherwise well within its regulatory powers. But the 
basic task was a familiar one. The Court reviewed government 
action in light of precedent, and responded to what some citizens 
175. !d. at 670. 
176. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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view as an arbitrary imposition and purposeless restraint. 177 It 
spoke of liberty, privacy, and human dignity, and it chose to act 
to protect them, despite the political firestorm it surely knew 
would follow. 
If Lawrence is condemned over time as poorly crafted or 
analytically shaky, but correctly decided as a matter of policy 
and justice, it will be in superb constitutional company, as Brown 
v. Board of Education proves. Breakthrough decisions typically 
are analytically imperfect because they rearrange relationships 
between and among the existing categories, and because the 
categories themselves are analytically imperfect. 
In any event, analytical purity is hardly the sole judicial goal 
here. Moreover, it is virtually unattainable in the highly abstract 
realm of constitutional law. Unless constitutional doctrine today 
has achieved perfection-a ludicrous notion for any generation 
of judges to embrace-then occasional analytical fissures may 
signal healthy growth, not doctrinal chaos or dissolution. Recog-
nizing this, a majority of the Court has never favored the death 
of doctrinal development- even in the highly contested arena of 
substantive due process-and has continued to apply doctrine to 
new terrain. The modern Court therefore is preserving tradition 
rather than disrupting it. 
2. Imperfect Government and the Shortcomings of Existing 
Categories 
Another reason to support evolutionary dynamism within 
equal protection and substantive due process doctrine is that 
government action can confound "reason" in remarkably exten-
sive ways that cannot be fully captured by any one set of princi-
ples or by current categories. 178 Indeed, a single act might be ir-
rational in multiple ways, though people may disagree about 
which types of reason it violates and why. Consequently, for the 
Court to draft an eternal set of doctrinal principles and a finite 
set of factors for all potential applications of these principles, 
would be astoundingly complex. The "common law" method 
177. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
178. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (1994) (noting that flexibility in 
rules is necessary because lawmakers cannot anticipate all consequences or contexts in 
advance); Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, 
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003) (The Supreme Court 2002 Term concluding that 
"constitutional law and culture are locked in a dialectical relationship, so that constitu-
tional law both arises from and in turn regulates culture"). 
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that Justice Scalia rejects thus is actually well-suited to the task 
of deciding these "rational basis" cases. 
A simple series of examples shows just how complex as-
sessments of rationality can become. Assume, for example, that 
the Congress or a state legislature adopts measure A, to promote 
end E. How might this act be irrational (though not necessarily 
unconstitutional)? A non-exhaustive list of logical flaws might 
include the following: 
1. A does not actually serve E. 
2. Government officials did not reasonably believe A served 
E when they enacted the measure, but it does in fact fur-
ther that end. E is a good end. 
3. A does serve E, but E is not a good end. 
4. A serves E, a good end, but is trumped by weightier good 
end F, which is substantially thwarted by A. 
5. A serves E, a good end, but also promotes F, a bad end 
(corollary of 4 ). 
6. A does serve good end E, but far less well than other 
means that serve E better. 
7. A does serve good end E, but government officials actu-
ally sought to promote E only in order to promote good 
end F, and A does not promote F. 
8. Government adopted A in order to serve E, a bad end, 
which A does serve, but it turns out to also serve end F, a 
good end. 
9. Government adopted A in order to serve E, a good end, 
but it did so knowing it would have a much harsher impact 
on a minority of citizens than others, but did it anyway. 
10. Government adopted A in order to serve E, but defined 
the class of individuals regulated by A in a manner that 
exempts some citizens but not others, with no "rational" 
basis for doing so. 
11. Same as 10, but government acted out of "animus" toward 
the burdened class of citizens, where burden on them is 
disproportionate to any harm to others that the regulation 
seeks to prevent. 
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12. Government followed a non-democratic process to deter-
mine whether to do E, though E is a good end, and the 
process does serve E. 
This series is obviously and intentionally incomplete-for 
example, it does not address the many process flaws that might 
render government action "irrational" under either equal pro-
tection or substantive due process.179 Nor does this list describe 
how to evaluate government rationality in the many cases where 
reliable evidence relevant to the regulatory inquiry is unavail-
able or inconclusive. 
Again, the five cases from the 2002 Term are exceptionally 
instructive. They show how difficult it would be for the Court to 
frame one test for "irrationality" that would capture all of the 
nuances raised by even a quite small number of cases. 
Where did each case from last term fall, within the above 
typography of "irrational" acts? 
The Texas statute in Lawrence arguably fell under 1, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. 
The Michigan admissions policies in Grutter and Gratz ar-
guably fell under 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. 
The differential tax scheme in Racing Association, however, 
arguably fell under 6 and 10, and the referendum process in 
Buckeye arguably fell under 4, 5, and 11. 
One might infer that the greater the number of possible "ir-
rationalities," the more likely it is that the Court will overturn a 
measure. In some cases, this assumption likely would hold-a 
government act that suffers from so many flaws may be harder 
to stomach. But this is not necessarily so: Grutter upheld the law 
school's policy, whereas Gratz struck the University's policy 
down, though both arguably were susceptible to the same, high 
number of characterizations as "irrational." (This is why the split 
results were so troublesome to many Court observers and poli-
cymakers.) Racing Association, in contrast, fit very few of the 
"irrationality" scenarios, yet would have come out differently if 
only one factor changed: if the citizens treated less well under 
179. In general, the Court has decided that a legislative act that serves a good end 
should be upheld, even if it was adopted for bad reasons. But this is not always, or even 
so literally, so. "Purpose" matters to constitutional analysis in many ways, and a very bad 
purpose may well influence a court's estimation of the gravity of the harms it produces. 
See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("It is a familiar principle of 
constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute 
on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motivation.") 
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the measure had been defined by race, gender, or state citizen-
ship- "type 10" irrationality." 
Buckeye was an alleged "political process" defect with a 
"state action" kicker. The outcome turned on i.he Court's reluc-
tance to ascribe alleged racial animus of voters to the City offi-
cials, where the officials' actions were apparently nondiscretion-
ary, were procedurally regular, and did not otherwise add an 
official boost to private animus. One can argue, of course, that 
the City's failure to modify its process to avoid giving private 
bias an official outlet was "irrational," in the same way that dis-
criminatory action by the City itself would have been irrational 
(Type 9). The Court over time has decided to treat these bias 
scenarios differently, both as a function of the state action doc-
trine, and through its Washington v. Davis180 line of cases, which 
requires a showing of government's intent to discriminate 
against a protected class. But these limits on the meaning of dis-
crimination were not inevitable: they were judicial constructions 
of equality. 
In sum, regardless of doctrinal garb, all substantive due 
process and equal protection cases entail balancing. The Court in 
every decision must distinguish garden-variety government "irra-
tionality" (and uphold it), from government "irrationality" on 
stilts (and strike it down).Whatever categories the Court devel-
ops to capture the process will defy easy summary given the va-
riety of government acts that are subject to judicial review. The 
Court's "three tier" approach crudely separates cases into "close 
review"- "some review"- "little or no review" categories, but 
its actual and ongoing process of funneling cases into these cate-
gories is analytically imperfect, and a matter of balance, pragma-
tism, and judicial judgment. If this is judicial "activism," then ac-
tivism is inescapable. 
3. The Special Role of the Court 
Of course, to say that government may act irrationally, in 
multiple ways, or to point out recent examples of such acts, still 
does not prove that the Court should be given broad discretion 
to correct for these abuses as it sees fit. Instead, the wide variety 
of potential government errors may lead one to conclude that 
judicial flexibility should be curtailed, not expanded. 
180. 426 U.S. 239 (1976). See also Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252 (1977); see generally David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of 
Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935 (1989). 
580 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:547 
Justice Scalia, for one, surely would point to the foregoing 
list of potential government follies as an excellent argument 
against overturning government action, absent very explicit tex-
tual or historical indications that the action is improper. Thought 
he might concede that these decisions entail complex judgment 
calls, he would argue that they nevertheless should be made 
through the political process as far as possible. As imperfect and 
illogical as the political process might be, it surely beats the judi-
cial process every time-not because the government, acting 
through the people, acts rationally in any self-proving sense, but 
because "rationality" is never self-proving and may not even be 
the point of legislation. Consequently, all of these policy deci-
sions should be left to the wider democratic process, and cer-
tainly should not be made by a "law trained elite. "181 That is, the 
Court should talk the formalist talk and walk the formalist 
walk-all the way to doctrine's edge. 
Once again, however, I disagree about Justice Scalia's as-
sumptions about the current application of the worthy general 
principle of judicial restraint. To be sure, intervention by un-
elected federal judges is not a proper vehicle for bottom up pol-
icy formulation. But, the Court intervenes only after government 
officials have acted, and their actions have been challenged by 
citizens as cruel, captured, clueless, or corrupt. This intervention 
is not necessarily a disruption of "democracy," and may even be 
described as a vehicle for perfecting it. A much worse alterna-
tive, as I see it, would be for judges to so align themselves with 
government officials that they refused to ever act on their power 
of review, even in cases brought by citizens who insist they have 
been seriously mistreated. 182 Such robust, horizontal, and vertical 
181. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Cf John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2395 (2003) (not-
ing that " a statute's apparently odd contours may reflect unknowable compromises or 
legislators' behind-the-scenes strategic maneuvers" so that "a legislative classification can 
seem absurd (in a policy sense) but still be rational (in a process sense) as a means of as-
suring the passage of the overall legislation")). That is, close examination of how laws 
actually are made undermine notions of "rational legislation" in ways that may point 
against judicial interventions. Of course, the "irrationality" of the process may prompt 
others to argue that judicial interventions are necessary. 
182. Many commentators, of course, have already made similar observations, with 
varying degrees of force and sophistication. Among the most famous of these is the late 
John Hart Ely's account of judicial review, which too anticipates a modest corrective role 
for the judiciary to play in assuring that the democratic process remains participation-
oriented and representation-reinforcing. Countless others have critiqued or expanded 
upon Ely's theory, and many have focused on the complexities of defining a process de-
fect, or of identifying the type of "democracy" one hopes to protect through constitu-
tional law. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
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deference to government processes and officials-who range 
from members of Congress, to state legislators, state attorneys 
general, to university faculty committees, police officers, public 
librarians, park officials, municipal planning boards, border pa-
trol agents, to city council members, to prison guards, to parole 
officers, to child protective services investigators-would be con-
trary to our experience, our history, and our common sense. 
Moreover, there is no cross-contextual reason to assume 
that all or even most government action-whether at the state, 
local, or federal level-necessarily reflects any true "majority's" 
will. In many contexts, the opposite assumption is warranted. 183 
In what sense, then, are the foregoing government officials part 
of a "democratic" process? Many likely are not, and thus do not 
see themselves as such, or as constrained by democratic princi-
ples when they execute their duties. 
There also is no reason to condemn a decision simply be-
cause it emerges from a body composed of legally trained peo-
ple. Many government bodies besides the Supreme Court like-
wise are composed of "law trained elites," and the Supreme 
Court and the lower courts are hardly immune from cultural or 
political influences that affect government decisionmakers in 
other realms. Judges in several states are elected,184 and the 
process of appointing federal and state court judges is far from 
apolitical. Few if any judges operate unaware of or heedless of 
politics, despite respect for the limiting principles of judicial in-
dependence, textual constraint, and stare decisis, among other 
powerful curbs on judicial excess. 
There likewise is no reason to assume that the absence of 
"legal elites" in constitutional decisionmaking, in particular, 
would promote better substantive outcomes. Legally trained 
REVIEW (1980). See a/so ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: 
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962) (describing the "counter-
majoritarian" difficulty); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT 78 (2001) (arguing that judicial review is not inconsistent with self-
governance); JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
SELF-GOVERNMENT 168, 172 (2002) (arguing that "constitutionalism is not counter to 
democracy," that constitutionalism "is required by democracy" and a written Constitu-
tion demands judicial review); MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAy 
FROM THE COURTS 129-53 (1999) (questioning the courts' capabilities); JEREMY 
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 296-98 (1999) (arguing that the judiciary sup-
plants popular values). 
183. See EISGRUBER, supra note 182, at 78. 
184. See Daniel Isaacs & Sandra Newman, Historical Overview of the Judicial Selec-
tion Process in the United States: Is the Electoral System in Pennsylvania Unjustified?, 49 
VILL. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
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people have profession-specific experiences that may be directly 
relevant to constitutional law. For one thing, they have received 
an education that typically includes instruction in constitutional 
decisionmaking over time, discussion of alternative methods of 
constitutional interpretation, and the cautionary tales of Lochner 
v. New York, Korematsu v. United States, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 
and Plessy v. Ferguson. For another, judges and lawyers get a 
close look at the actual impact of government policy on the gov-
erned. Granting judges authority to mitigate the harshest, cruel-
est, or most unintended consequences of these laws -especially 
when the consequences are felt only by a small minority of citi-
zens-seems a sensible, reasonably efficient, even democracy-
enhancing corrective to a sometimes wooden and unfeeling legis-
lative process. Recall that this nullification power is exercised in-
frequently, is subject to further review, proceeds on the basis of 
analogies to past decisions, and is conducted in public.185 This 
modest check on public officials is especially important as ap-
plied to policies that are adopted by the countless low-visibility 
decisionmakers whose actions otherwise would never pass 
through a public, deliberative body. 
Once again, the 2002 term speaks volumes. In Lawrence, the 
Court addressed the culturally riveting issue of gay rights-or, as 
Justice Scalia put it, "the homosexual agenda."186 In his view, le-
gal "elites" may have effected a "massive disruption of the cur-
rent social order." Here, as in Romer, Justice Scalia condemned 
the Court for taking a stand in the culture wars. 187 Yet this par-
ticular culture war -if it deserves this name-erupted due to so-
cial activism, the AIDS crisis, modern films and theater, televi-
sion, talk shows, religious and political responses to activism, and 
other nonlegal contributors to cultural foment over the issues, 
not from a court decision. 
The Court in Lawrence did step into a cultural fray, to be 
sure. But no matter how the Court resolved Lawrence, it would 
have been engaged in that fray, and properly so: this cultural war 
has become an intense battle over the reach of our Constitution 
and over the proper balance between individual rights and ma-
joritarian morality. If the Court refused to enter this battle on 
the ground that it is not its place, then it ought to beat a hasty re-
185. For a particularly compelling development of this argument, with which I con-
cur, see EISGRUBER, supra note 182. 
186. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2496 (Scalia,J., dissenting). 
187. Romer, 518 U.S. at 652 (Scalia,J., dissenting). 
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treat in many other realms where it traditionally has played a 
prominent role.188 
In any event, legally trained elites actually may be quite well 
situated to examine the rationality of theories that are com-
monly advanced in support of criminalization of sexual relations 
between same sex partners. As Justice Scalia notes -though with 
sarcasm-sanctions against homosexual, bisexual, and transgen-
dered people have been lifted in law schools as a matter of 
AALS policy.189 Consequently, law students may be more open 
about their sexuality. Law graduates thus may have impressions 
of homosexuality that depart from dire predictions about what 
would happen if taboos against same-sex relations were lifted. 
Their attitudes may not be the product of "political correctness" 
or any "group think" foisted upon students by liberal law profes-
sors; rather, they may be based on their direct experiences with 
their openly gay or lesbian colleagues.190 These experiences may 
affect their evaluation of the professional and personal conse-
quences of criminalizing sexual relations between same-sex 
partners. That is, "judicial notice" of how the world works-not 
professional proselytizing or elitism-may have change some 
judges' views about sodomy laws.191 
I am not arguing-it would be absurd to do so-that legal 
professionals are inherently better than nonprofessionals at 
making policy decisions for the country. Rather, I am arguing 
that they may play an important role in constitutional assess-
ments of the reasons underlying policy decisions that burden in-
dividual liberties, in part because of the training they receive and 
188. Cf Post, supra note 178, at 81 (noting that courts simply cannot apply constitu-
tional doctrine without drawing upon their understandings of cultural practices). 
189. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that AALS 
rules require member schools to ban from job interview facilities a Jaw firm that does not 
wish to hire openly gay or lesbian lawyers); Bylaws of the Association of American Law 
Schools, Inc., § 6-4 (prohibiting discrimination based upon sexual orientation). 
190. In similar ways, the American businesses, the United States military, and the 
hundreds of educational institutions that weighed in on the value of "diversity" in last 
term's affirmative action cases may not have been speaking on the basis of any "elitist" 
privilege or out of "political correctness," but on the basis of their own direct, democra-
tizing experiences with students, workers, and soldiers from diverse backgrounds. If any-
thing, the diversity principles and practices they endorsed would displace privilege and 
undercut elitism; it is quite difficult to view affirmative action that benefits racial minori-
ties as a "capture" problem that reserves benefits solely for the already most prosperous, 
social, and political "elites." 
191. Cf Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 330 (D.C. 1995) (discussing why 
a legislallve heanng may not be better suited than a court hearing when determining fac-
tual claims about the nature and causes of homosexuality, given the political ramifica-
tiOns of appeanng to endorse homosexuality). 
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their professional commitments. In any event, to argue that the 
"elitism" inherent in professional training makes judicial deci-
sions inherently antidemocratic strikes me as flat-out wrong. If it 
were true, it would be difficult to justify judicial review in nearly 
any form. 
Similarly unpersuasive is Justice Scalia's occasional indict-
ment of the Court for relying on "personal predilection" in re-
solving substantive due process and equal protection cases. 192 If 
the Court leaves this scene of constitutional decisionmaking 
solely on the basis that the Justices' personal predilections might 
influence how they interpret facts and apply the principles, then 
it should leave most of them, given the nature of the beast. Jus-
tices are not potted plants and inevitably must draw on experi-
ence when deciding tough cases. It is mystifying that Justice 
Scalia in particular would complain that judges may act-in 
part-on their "personal predilections," given his legal realist 
statements about judges. For example, in Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, 193 he viewed as obvious and unproblematic 
that any well-qualified judicial candidate will have "predilec-
tions," and concluded a candidate should be allowed to talk 
about these views when running for an elected judicial post, even 
though he or she also must act "impartially" if elected.194 Justice 
Scalia must believe, as I do, that bending to facts, as one per-
ceives them through the lens of one's life experiences, is not the 
same as bending facts. If so, he might consider the wider implica-
tions of this insight for constitutional doctrine, rhetoric, and in-
terpretation. 
Perhaps Justice Scalia would respond that the primary prob-
lem with a flexible, evolutionary approach to substantive due 
process and equal protection doctrine is not that the Court lacks 
special insights, but that flexibility destabilizes doctrine and 
makes context matter too much. This kind of unpredictability 
seems to be the crux of his gripe that Grutter and Gratz will 
spawn new litigation. Again, however, the objection is uncon-
vincing. Some unpredictability about future applications of con-
stitutional principles announced by the Court comes with the 
territory, as any observer of constitutional law well knows. The 
text is vague, the principles are general, the doctrine is composed 
192. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1002 
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
193. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
194. !d. at 784. 
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by multiple authors, not one univocal author, and the result can 
be maddeningly obscure. 
Consider the following criticisms of constitutional doctrine, 
across many fields, and in general: 
Unless the Court modifies or attempts to clarify its approach, 
standing doctrine will likely remain a mystery to litigants and 
lower courts. 195 
The [political question] doctrine has always proven to be an 
enigma to commentators. Not only have they disagreed about 
its wisdom and validity ... but they also have differed signifi-
cantly over the doctrine's scope and rationale. 196 
A persistently disturbing aspect of constitutional law is its lack 
of theory, a lack which is manifest not merely in the work of 
the courts but in the public, professional, and even scholarly 
discussion of the topic. 197 
The past, particularly the aspects that the interpretivists care 
about, is in its essence indeterminate; the interpretivist project 
cannot be carried to its conclusion. 198 
The "rational basis" test is thus hardly the only constitu-
tional doctrine vulnerable to the critique of "incoherence," "sub-
jectivity," or "contextualism." Even within the category of strict 
scrutiny, many doctrinal permutations have emerged that hinge 
on context. "Government classifications sometimes require "im-
portant" government reasons, "compelling government reasons" 
or "exceedingly persuasive" government reasons. In United 
States v. Virginia, for example, the Court demanded "exceed-
ingly persuasive" justifications for gender-based classifications-
placing these classifications in a grey zone above "intermediate" 
and just below "strict" scrutiny terminology.199 
In the free speech area, where explicit text protects the right 
in question, the Court has created a doctrinal morass. The gen-
195. TRIBE, supra note 161, at 111, § 3-15. 
196. Martin Redish, Judicial Review and the Political Question, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 
1031 (1985). Indeed, one might simply read the title of Louis Henkin's well-known piece, 
Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976), to see the level of con-
fusion that the Supreme Court decisions in this area can generate. 
197. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J.1 (1971). 
198. Mark Y. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of lnterpretivism 
and Newral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781,800 (1983). 
199. 518 U.S. 515,525 (1996). 
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eral claim that content-based government regulations of speech 
trigger "strict scrutiny" is subject to so many exceptions that the 
statement is extremely misleading. In a recent case involving 
congressional conditions on federal funds for public libraries, 
Justice Breyer suggested that the Court use "heightened, but not 
'strict scrutiny."' It supplements the latter with an approach that 
is more flexible but nonetheless provides the legislature with less 
than ordinary leeway in light of the fact that constitutionally pro-
tected expression is at issue. 
Were Justice Breyer's suggestion one's first encounter with 
constitutional law, one might leave the field in despair, especially 
if one came to it expecting doctrinal lines to be stark, driven by 
pages of history, and warranted by the "plain meaning" of the 
text. After multiple exposures to constitutional law, however, 
the passage seems unremarkable, even wise, given the multiple 
forces a court must juggle in imposing first amendment limits on 
government funding power. Why, then, would a Supreme Court 
Justice, of all people, express shock and dismay over and over 
again at judicial interpretive practices that demand balancing of 
interests, or which change with the times or in context? The 
practice is well ingrained, inescapable, and deeply embedded in 
the very process of interpreting and apply imperfectly drafted 
laws to fact patterns often not anticipated by the rule makers. 
That said, the indeterminacy of constitutional law can easily 
be overstated. Despite the murkiness, there are remarkably few 
surprises. Once again, the decisions of the 2002 term are instruc-
tive. Although Justice Scalia lamented the open-ended implica-
tions of Grutter and Gratz, he seemed truly outraged about what 
he saw as the inevitable effects of Lawrence.200 Yet if predictabil-
ity were a primary goal, and if Scalia reads Lawrence's future 
impact correctly, then why is the case so worrisome? Moreover, 
all of the cases last term actually were quite predictable -many 
Court observers anticipated that O'Connor would be cast the 
deciding vote in the affirmative action cases and might well "split 
the difference." Nearly everyone expected the Court to overturn 
the Texas statute, once it agreed to hear the case. And all could 
have predicted the outcomes in Buckeye and Racing Association. 
Unpredictability thus was not a major problem last year. 
In any event, predictability alone hardly marks an unerring 
path to sound constitutional decisions. A Justice could always 
uphold racial classifications, or never uphold them. Likewise, a 
200. 123 S. Ct. at 2491 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Justice could always uphold sexual orientation classifications, or 
never do so. As the race and sexual orientation cases demon-
strate, however, the real world is simply not that easy, and nei-
ther is the constitutional doctrine that grapples with real-world 
problems in an ever-changing environment. 
Given the Court's actual interpretive practices, and given 
the departures these practices occasionally produce, one might 
argue that the Court should at least do a better job of matching 
its words with its deeds. The Court should openly state that it 
follows one dynamic, pragmatic, and context-driven approach to 
substantive due process and e~ual protection, and jettison talk of 
categories or tiers of review.20 It should simply ask in each case 
whether government has convincing reasons for acts that signifi-
cantly burden liberty, property or life, and identify a nonexhaus-
tive cluster of concerns for lower courts to consider that go be-
yond stare decisis and text- for example, the significance of the 
interest affected, the democratic and deliberative nature of the 
body that produced the rule, the nature of the group burdened, 
the nature of the harm the rule produces, alternative avenues for 
overcoming the rule's harsh consequences, the nature of the 
harm to others if the rule is voided, and the role of empirical un-
knowns. 
It could assert a strong presumption against disruption of 
truly democratic procedures that allow for meaningful participa-
tion by the citizens most affected by the rule in question, but in-
sist that other rules-especially ones that single out a minority of 
citizens with respect to important interests that are enjoyed by 
others with no comparable government restraints- be examined 
more closely. Or, it might abandon formalism altogether, in fa-
vor of a Posnerian approach that pays closer attention to conse-
quences, and less to abstract principles.202 Finally, it might begin 
all constitutional cases with the following reminder of the 
Court's anti-majoritarian virtues: "[sjo long as the Court exer-
cises the power of judicial review ... , it should not only protect 
'safe' or orthodox views which rarely need its protection. "203 This 
201. This is essentially the approach favored by Justice Stevens and by Justice Thur-
good Marshall. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J. concurring) ("the 
two-tiered analysis ... actually appl(ies] a single standard"); San Antonio Indep. School 
D1st. V. Rodngucz, 411 U.S. 1, 110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing for a 
method that considers the "invidiousness" of the classification and the "importance of 
the interest adversely affected by it"). 
202. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY passim 
(2003). 
203. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,580 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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incantation would reinforce that the Court properly corrects for 
government excesses and preserves substantive and procedure 
values, as a matter of institutional design and purpose. Under 
this open-ended, legal realist approach, existing equal protection 
and substantive due process case law would continue to frame 
the Court's analysis of future cases in much the same way it now 
does, but under a "tier free," nonformulaic rubric. 
The primary advantage of this approach would be its trans-
parency: it would better describe what the Supreme Court actu-
ally does when it develops doctrine. I believe the approach-
which I have called "the thin, 'constitutional law unplugged'" 
strategf04 - has considerable other virtues, especially in the 
arena of so-called "gay rights." 
The considerable and overpowering drawbacks of this ap-
proach across the spectrum of cases, however, are at least three-
fold. First, the work of the lower courts is not the same as the 
work of the Supreme Court. Lower courts likely are better 
guided and constrained by blunt categories than by fluid, multi-
factored tests. Second, the "unplugged" strategy is misleading. 
The Court itself relies on the blunt categories in many cases; 
abandoning the tiers might mask how many cases these formulas 
actually do resolve, with very little judicial reflection and virtu-
ally no dissent. 
Finally, an open and unapologetic embrace of judicial flexi-
bility could damage the Court's public credibility at a particu-
larly inopportune moment. As the 2002 Term shows, the Court 
actually does exercise restraint -and lots of it- but nevertheless 
is disparaged as unduly activist by critics from multiple perspec-
tives. If the Court were to now justify its power in more openly 
realist terms, this could further obscure its inherent conservatism 
in the minds of its many detractors, lower court judges might en-
gage in more activism. There is something to be said for judicial 
rhetoric that understates the judiciary's power rather than lan-
guage that captures it fully. There is little good to be said, 
though, for rhetoric that overstates its powers in a moment when 
the Court's independence is being attacked vigorously, even 
from within. Now may not be the time for the Supreme Court to 
deliver a public lecture on legal realism, or even to offer a hom-
ily on the practical and enduring wisdom of a constitutional sys-
tem that gives the Court power to occasionally upend official 
acts. 
204. Massaro, supra note 50, at 109. 
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CONCLUSION 
The 2002 Term surely was a term to remember. Some of us 
soared when we read the high-profile equal protection and sub-
stantive due process decisions; others already are rallying politi-
cal forces and even drafting constitutional amendments to un-
dermine them.205 To assess the Court's performance fairly, 
however, we must look beyond the front page of newspapers, 
and beyond our own ideologies. 
The full equal protection and substantive due process 
docket revealed a Court exercising balance and prudence. It was 
neither excessively activist nor excessively passive. It acted cau-
tiously, predictably, and sanely. It invoked prevalent social prac-
tices, its own precedent, and well-established constitutional val-
ues in reaching its decisions. It clung to traditional categories 
while grappling with the inevitable slippage between them. This 
was a centrist-to conservative Court acting sensibly-even sensi-
tively. 
In a moment when the academic and public fashion is to 
bury the judiciary, not to praise it, these redeeming features 
should not go unnoticed. At the very least, we should recognize 
that the sky above our democratic institutions is not falling-
despite clamors to the contrary. Nor have angels of liberty 
landed in America. Lawmaking will continue after Lawrence, 
Grutter, and Gratz, and- I predict-will continue to occasionally 
challenge, if not utterly defy, reason. 
Unlike Justice Scalia, I do look forward to litigation that 
questions the rationality of official lawmaking, both in well trav-
eled and in unfamiliar realms. Together, equal protection and 
substantive due process doctrine demonstrate that a baseline ex-
pectation of rational government endures, and that passes for 
reason inevitably will evolve in an unelected judiciary's hands. 
More formalism here is not warranted, as some would have us 
believe. Indeed, any less dynamism would ill serve democracy, 
and notions of liberty, as both have been traditionally under-
stood. 
These simple lessons are worth underscoring, lest they be 
drowned out by the far more riveting, impassioned descriptions 
205. See Jeffrey Rosen, How to Reignite the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003, 
at.§ 6,_ 48 (predicting the backlash against "gay rights"); see also Michigan Civil Rights 
Imttallve, supra note 151 (dtscussmg the political movement in Michigan to prevent any 
use of race in admissions). 
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of a "runaway judiciary." Hyperbolism makes great copy and 
rallies political coalitions, but it obscures truth and may lead se-
rious observers afield. The 2002 Term offers a corrective to these 
exaggerated images and a reminder that existing doctrine often 
grants considerable deference to democratic processes. From 
this more accurate starting point, we might better engage in de-
bates about how that doctrine might be improved, and to what 
ends. 
